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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
G. C.
corporation,

CO., a Ptah
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

YIRGIL J. LLOYD, l\iIARY C.
LLOYD, his wife, and RAMADA INN
OF PROVO, INC., a Utah Corporation,

Case No.
12519

Defendants-Respondents.

Brief of Defendants-Respondents

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
Respondents agree with appellant's statement of
the disposition in the lower court.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Respondents pray this appeal be dismissed.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents will incorporate by reference certain
of appellant's statement of facts. However, to add simplicity and aid the Court's understanding, let it be stated
that this appeal revolves around two separate cases and
the interpretation of four interrelated contracts. Appellant's main contention on this appeal is that the issues
presented by defendant's counterclaim in the lower court
had been disposed of, reduced to judgment, and thereby
rendered res judicata, by a separate prior lawsuit involving the same parties, subject matter, and issues. The first
lawsuit, which appellant asserts laid these issues to rest
with finality, is Civil No. 31,379, tried before the Honorable Judge l\Iaurice Harding, in the Fourth Judicial
District for Utah County. Certain of the pleadings therein may be found on Pages 105 to 129 of the Record On
Appeal as designated by appellant. The second action,
in which appellant urges there was error in recognizing
the exhaustive character of the said first case, is Civil
No. 31,752, tried before the Honorable Judge Joseph E.
Nelson, also in the Fourth Judicial District for Utah
County. The bulk of the record is constituted by pleadings from this second case. (R. 3-128). The aforementioned contracts which find significance in these cases are
annexed to plaintiff-appellant's Complaint in the action
on appeal, No. 31,752, (R. 3), and are as follows: an
agreement of December 31, 1965, (R. 6-13), and it's undated modification addendum, (R. 14); an agreement
of February 23, 1967, ( R. 1.5-19) ; an agreement of
2

l\Iarch 23, 1967, (H. 20-23); and an agreement of April
24, 1967, (R. 24-27).
Also to avoid confusion note that plaintiff-appellant
in the second case, now on appeal, was the third-party defendant in the first case and the defendants-respondents
were the defendants and third party complainants therein, as well as the defendants and counterclaimants in the
second case. (R. 82 and 105). Plaintiff in the first case,
Gerald Horman Construction Co., is not a party in the
second case on appeal and is not the same as plaintiffa ppellant, C. G. Horman Construction Co. The Court
in the second case dismissed plaintiff-appellant's Complaint and rendered judgment on defendants-respondent's counterclaim. ( R. 82) .
With respect to plaintiff's statement regarding the
initial contract between the parties entered into December 31, 1965, respondents hereby incorporate appellant's
statement of facts, pages 2 through 4 of appellant's brief.
Respondents further take no exception to appellant's
explanation of why the parties entered into a second
agreement February 23, 1967, modifying their agreement of December 31, 1965 (p. 4, Appellant's Brief).
However, it should be pointed out that the agreement of
February 23, 1967, stated that although, "whereas
Lloyd-Ramada and Hormans desire to terminate and
cancel said agreement (December 31, 1965), and their
respective benefits and liabilities thereunder, and desfre
to compromise a full and complete settlement and a release of all claims, demands, causes of action and any
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agreements, written or oral, existing between themselves
and their companies, and to forever resolve all claims and
demands of themselves individually or through their
above named companies ... " (R. 15) (Emphasis added), this clause did not purport to state that this February contract did in fact settle or compromise anything.
It only stated that the parties "desired" to reach a settlement and specifically asserted that a quarrel still existed
between the parties and that if agreement could not indeed be reached resort to the courts would be appropriate and necessary:
A dispute exists between Lloyd-Ramada and
Hormans as to the balance, if any, that should
be paid to G. C. Horman Company upon the
completion of the motel construction; and if C.
G. Horman Company so desires, at any time
"'ithin one vear, this matter mav be submitted to
the Fourth
District
on a friendly
basis, for the court's determination of the rights
under their contract of December 31, 1965, and
any subsequent modifications. (R. 16) (Emphasis added). (Contract, J?ebruary 23, 1967).
The process for adjudicating this matter was set forth in
the next paragraph:
Lloyd-Ramada agree to retain and pay Leon
Frazier to handle said suit. If Hormans desire
to retain a separate attorney, they agree to pay
their own attorney fees. Both parties agree to
abide b.lf the decision of the District Court and
no appeal will be taken to the Supreme Cou,rt.
(R. 16) (Emphasis added). (Contract, February 23, 1967)
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This procedure for resolving the dispute was later
reinforced by the agreement of :March 23, 1967, which
was designed to facilitate the parties' "desire to exercise
certain rights contained in the said agreements." ( R. 20).
The March 23, 1967, contract prepared on the stationary of plaintiff-appellant's attorney states, inter alia,
that " ... provided, however, that such release shall not
he construed as a waiver of their right to litigate their
claims for such additional sums against Lloyd and Ramada individually." (R. 20-21).
Although the March agreement does not specifically
refer back to the previously mentioned formula for resolving the parties' differences, a subsequent agreement
dated April 24, 1967, (R. 24-27) was entered into by the
parties which clearly revealed their intention to abide by
the procedure advanced in the February 23, 1967, contract for resolving the parties contentions over their
rights and obpligations recited in the December 31, 1965
agreement. The more salient portion of this, the last
statement of the parties intent, is as follows:
Nothing contained herein shall be construed as
a waiver of the claim of C. G. Horman Company
that it is actually entitled to an additional sum
of Fiftv-five Thousand Five-hundred Dollars
($55,500.00) (constituting $111,000.00 total)
for the sale of its interest in the land and improvements constituting the said motel complex.
Nor shall anything contained herein be construed
as a waiver to any defense or
of set-o"!f
which could be asserted by Lloyds Ramada m
the event of suit by C. G. Horman Company
with respect to their claim. "/VTothing contained
5

herein shall be construed as a modification of the
procedure set forth in the said agreement of February 23, 1967, for the determination of that
claim . . . . ( R. 25) (Emphasis added) . (Contract, April 24, 1967).
This last statement of the parties' intentions, more
specifically, affirming the February contract to submit
the dispute to the court, if necessary, and abide by that
court's decision, and waiving their right to appeal, as set
forth in the contract of February 23, 1967, (R. 16), was
signed by all the parties, presumably under at least the
advice of plaintiff's counsel, on plaintiff's counsel's office
stationary, ( R. 26), and was in fact notarized by plaintiff's then and present counsel, John G. Marshall ( R.
27, Contract, April 24, 1967).
As stated in the appellant's brief (p. 7), upon completion of the motel construction, because of a further
dispute over the quality of performance of the General
Contractor, Gerald Horman, respondents refused to pay
Gerald Horman Construction Company, which was
thereby moved to cause a mechanic's lien to be filed and
to commence an action (Civil No. 31,379 Judge Maurice
Harding) in the Fourth Judicial District, Utah County,
on or about October 19, 1967, against defendants (respondents herein), and others. Lloyd-Ramada filed a
third party complaint against C. G. IIorman, plaintiffappellant herein, (R. 112 and 113), which was subsequently amended. ( R. 115). In essence the cross-complaint and amended cross-complaint averred that C. G.
Horman Breached its contract of December 31, 1965, in
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ref using to assist in obtaining the financing for construction of the motel project, including the obligation of assuming individual liability on the mortgage loans, and
that the third party defendant refused to sign the mortgage loans as required for financing of the project.
As set forth in appellant's brief, ( p. 8) trial of this
first case, Civil No. 31,379, was held July 1, 2 and 3,
1969, the Honorable l\Iaurice Harding presiding. Appellant's brief further states that "both the defendant,
Virgil J. Lloyd and his attorney, Leon Frazier, took the
stand as witnesses and testified with respect to the allegations of Lloyd's counterclaim and third party complaint, including the matter relating to the alleged
breach of contract by the C. G. Horman Company." (P.
8 Appellant's brief). This statement dehors the record.
The record on this appeal is entitrely devoid of any indication of who testified or the substance of any testimony
given in Civil No. 31,379.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court awarded
judgment for Gerald Horman Construction Company,
and dismissed the cross-complaint of defendant LloydRamada, although the record does not clearly disclose
this latter item as appellant did not see fit to designate
the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure in the first
case, Civil No. 31,379. The Lloyds third-party complaint
was in fact dismissed without prejudice (R. 124, if20).
Important portions of the Findings of Fact are here set
forth:
7. That pursuant to the Agreement of December
31, 1965, a First :Mortgage, secured by a Promis7

sory Note in the amount of $fil5,000.00 was executed by C. G. I-Iorman Co. and Virgil J. Lloyd
and l\:Iary C. Lloyd, his wife; that thereafter
a dispute developed between C. G. Horman Co.
on the one hand and Virgil J. Lloyd and 1\1.:ary
C. Lloyd, his wife, on the other hand, as to the
obligation, if any, which C. G. Horman Co. had
to execute a Second Mortgage commitment in the
amount of $60,000.00; that in fact no such Second Mortgage commitment had ever been obtained, and the parties compromised and settled
that dispute by the execution of an Agreement
dated February 23, 1967, a copy of which was
introduced into evidence as EXHIBIT P-7.
8. That as part of the compromise and settlement

of the said dispute, C. G. Horman Co. agreed to
sell its interest in the motel project to Ramada
Inn of Provo, Inc., Virgil J. Lloyd and Mary C.
Lloyd, his wife, but the parties were unable to
agree on the purchase price. That the parties did
agree that C. G. Horman Co. was to receive the
sum of $55,500.00 but reserved for subsequent
determination by resort to the courts, if necessary, the question of whether C. G. Horman Co.
was entitled to any additional sum as the purchase price of its interest. That a separate action
has been commenced in the District Court of the
Fourth J udir'ial District in and for lJtah County,
State of ·utah, as CiYil No. 31752 to resolve that
dispute. That except for the matters of additional sums, if any, due C. G. Horman Co. on
account of the p urchase of its interest in the
motel project by Ramada Inn of Provo, Inc.,
Virgil J. Lloyd and 1Vlary C. Lloyd, his wife,
the parties (that is C. G. Horman Co., Ramada
Inn of Provo, Inc., Virgil J. Lloyd and Mary
C. Lloyd, his wife) compromised and settled and
0
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fully released all claims existing between themselves by the terms of the Agreement of February 23, 1967, as implemented by Agreement between the same parties dated March 23, 1967, a
eopy of which was admitted in evidence as EXHIBIT P-11.
20. That by reason of the Agreement dated
February 23, 19()7 (Exhibit P-7), the Agreement dated
23, 1967, (Exhibit P-8) , and
the Agreement dated April 24, 1967, (Exhibit
P-11), between Yirgil J. Lloyd and Mary C.
Lloyd, his wife, and Ramada Inn of Provo, Inc.
on the one hand and C. G. Horman Co. and
Gerald Horman Construction Company on the
other hand, the Court dismissed the Third-Party
Complaint of Virgil J. Lloyd and Mary C.
Lloyd, his wife, and Ramada Inn of Provo, Inc.
against C. G. Horman Co., without prejudice
to the rights of Virgil J. Lloyd, Mary C. Lloyd,
his wife, and Ramada Inn of Provo, Inc. to state
a defense or right of setoff against C. G. Horman
Co. in Civil action No. 31752 pending in the
Fourth .ludiical District Court in and for Utah
Count, State of Utah. (Emphasis added). (R.
120; R. 121; R.124) .
Certain statements in appellant's brief (p. 10 and
11) are not in contention: Prior to trial of Civil No. 31,379,, C. G. Horman Company commenced the instant
action, No. 31,752, February 21, 1968, which was still
awaiting trial pending final judgment in Civil No. 31,379; in the second case,No. 31,752, defendants-respondents herein filed an Answer and Counterclaim which set
forth the same issues which had been set up against C. G.
Horman Company in their amended third party com9

plaint in Civil No. 31,379, i.e., alleging that C. G. Horman had breached its contract to assist in obtaining the
financing for construction of the motel project; the reply
of C. G. Horman did not set up res judicata as a defense,
since the judgment in case number one, Civil No. 31,379,
had not been rendered.
Appellant states that, "No appeal was taken from
the judgment in Civil No. 31,379, which became final in
August, 1969. (P. 10, appellant's brief). Although not a
material misstatement, the record indicates that the first
case became final by a memorandum decision filed October 8, 1969, (R. 127), denying defendant, Lloyd-Ramada' s Motion lo Amend Findings of Fact, set aside
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Stay Proceedings, ( R. 128, 129). Apparently then the first case became final in November of 1969.
However, it is a fact that appellant made a motion
for summary judgment on September 16, 1969, (R. 63)
based on the prior judgment in Civil No. 31,379, and that
on April 10, 1970, the court entered an order denying
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and setting
the matter for trial September 23, 1970. (R. 70). The
trial of the instant matter was held before the Honorable
Judge Joseph E. Nelson, at the conclusion of which a
memorandum decision was entered ( R. 77) and subsequently Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment (R. 78-82), the court dismissing appellant's
complaint and awarding respondents judgment on their
counterclaim in the amount of $20,000. Both parties
10

moved for post-judgment relief: appellant moved for
New Trial or in the alternative, to amend the Findings
of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Judgment, or in the
alternative, to strike the Judgment ( R. 84), and respondents moved to enlarge the Judgment. (R. 91). The
court's ruling on those motions, denying each, dated
l\'larch 30, 1971, was entered and filed April 8, 1971. (R.
97). From that judgment appellant prosecutes this appeal.
As the Supreme Court may be aware, respondent's
former attorney of record, Leon Frazier, was ill with
terminal cancer. He died during pendency of this appeal,
and respondents' present counsel did not know of this
case nor enter his appearance herein until after appellant
had already filed its brief on appeal. Thus, certain items
which are notably absent from the record could not have
been supplied by respondent at such a late date. Respondent submits that those documents were essential to
substantiate appellant's position regarding the doctrine
of res judicata and it was encumbent upon appellant to
designate those in the record on appeal. There is no testimony of any of the witnesses at either trial; the Complaint in Civil No. 31,379, the first action, is absent, and
especially important is the failure of appellant to designate the Decree and Judgment of Foreclosure in Civil
No. 31,379, which is vital to the issue of res judicata.
For the fore going reasons, respondent sets forth, in
toto, the entire Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure in
Civil No. 31,379 which was not designated as part of the
record:
11

JOHN G. MARSHALL
TUFT, MARSHALL AND MEDLIN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 721 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone 359-8657
Area Code 801

In the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
in and for Utah County, State of Utah
GERALD HOHMAN CONSTHUCr-rION COl\IP ANY, a corporntion,
Plaintiff,

vs.
VIRGIL J. LLOYD, ET AL.,
Defendants.

I
1

I

c·iv1.1No.
31379

JCDG:\IEXT AXD DECREE OF
FORECLOSURE
The above entitled matter having come on for trial
before the Honorable l\Iaurice Harding, Judge, of the
above entitled court, on July 1st, 2nd and 3rd, 1969, the
plaintiff and C. G. Horman Co., third-party defendant,
appearing through John G. l\Iarshall, Esq., of Tuft,
Marshall and 1\Iedlin; the defendants Virgil J. Lloyd
and Mary C. Lloyd, his wife, and Leon
Frazer and
Ruth M. Frazier, his wife, and Ramada Inn of Provo,
Inc., appearing through Leon l\1. Frazier, Esq.; the defendants 'Val er 'V. Kershaw and Barbara K. Summers
12

appearing through Louis H. Callister, Sr., Esq. of Callister, Kesler and Callister; the defendant Zions First
National Bank appearing through J olm H. Allen, Esq.,
of Cannon, Green, Nebeker and Horsley; and the defendant Acoustics, Inc. appearing through Nolan J. Olsen, Esq.;
And the parties having presented oral testimony and
documentary evidence, and having submitted the matter
to the Court; and the Court having entered in writing its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
NO,V, THEREFORE, upon motion of counsel
for plaintiff, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. That the plaintiff, Gerald Horman Construction

Company, be and it hereby is awarded judgment against
the defendants Virgil J. Lloyd and Mary C. Lloyd, his
wife, and Ramada Inn of Provo, Inc., and each of them,
inth e sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred Seventyeight and 78/100 Dollars ($2,578.28) principal, together
with interest in the sum of $1,941.03 to July 1, 1969, and
attorney's fees in the amount of $5,137.50, together with
plaintiff's costs incurred herein in the amount of $83.65,
which judgment shall bear interest at the rate of eight
percent ( 8 % ) per annum from date hereof until satisfied and discharged.
2. That the interests of defendants Virgil J. Lloyd

and Mary C. Lloyd, his wife, and Ramada Inn of Provo,
Inc., and each of them, in and to that certain real prop-
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erty situated in Utah County, State of Utah, and particularly described as follows:
Commencing in the west boundary of U niversity Avenue, Provo, Gtah at a point 175.92 feet
South and 871.15 feet 'Vest of the N ort-heast
corner of Section 7 South, Range 2 East, Salt
Lak eBase and .M.eridian; thence South 0° 19'
\Vest along the south street boundary 218.30
feet; thence 89° 31' West 150.00 feet; thence
South 0 ° H)' \Vest 200 feet; thence North 89 ° 31'
West 288.24 feet; thence North 0° 03' East
-.tl8.32 feet; thence South 89° 31' 7East 440.20
feet to the point of beginning. Area 3.53 acres.
be sold by the Sheriff of Utah County, State of Utah, to
foreclose plaintiff's lien against said property, pursuant
to law as in the case of mortgages provided; that the proceeds of sale be applied toward the payment of the several sums found due and owing to plaintiff, after payment of costs of sale; and that if any deficiency remains
the plaintiff have and recover deficiency judgment
against the said Virgil J. Lloyd and Mary C. Lloyd, his
wife, and Ramada Inn of Provo, Inc., and each of them,
for the amount of such deficiency.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the plaintiff
or any party to this action may be a purchaser at said
Sheriff's sale; that the Sheriff issue to such purchaser a
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale, and that after the period of
redemption expires the said Sheriff issue to the purchaser a Sheriff's Deed to the interests foreclosed, and
said defendants and all persons claiming or to claim by,
through or under them, or either of them, shall be for14

ever barred and foreclosed of any right, title, interest,
equity and right of redemption in and to the said interests of said defendants in said premises by the issuance
of said Sheriff's Deed, and that plaintiff be awarded the
usual writ of assistance or other proper process against
defendants and all persons claiming by, through or under them for the possession of their interests in said
premises.
That the plaintiff's Complaint as against
';yALTER W. KERSHAW and BARBARA K.
SUMMERS be, and it hereby is dismissed with prejudice.
3.

4. That the Third-party Complaint of VIRGIL J.

LLOYD; MARY C. LLOYD, his wife; and RAMADA INN OF PROVO, INC., against C. G. HORMAN CO., Third-party defendant, be and it hereby is
dismissed without prejudice to the rights of Virgil J.
Lloyd; Mary C. Lloyd, his wife; and Ramada Inn of
Provo, Inc. to state a defense or right of setoff against
C. G. Horman Co. in Civil Action No. 31752 pending in
the above entitled court.
5. That the Counterclaim and Cross-Complaint of

LEON M. FRAZIER and RUTH M. FRAZIER,
his wife, be and it hereby is dismissed with prejudice.
6. That the claims of the plaintiff against ZIONS

FIRST NATIONAL BANK be, and hereby are reserved for consideration of the above entitled court at a
subsequent date, to be resolved by an amendment to the
Judgment entered herein.
15

7. That the stipulation of the parties with respect to
the claim of defendant ACOUSTICS,
in the
amount of $2,993.64, as set forth in the Findings of the
Court, be and it herewith is affirmed by the Court.
DATED this 18th day of July 1969.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT

URICE HARDING, District Judge
(Emphasis added)
The Court in the second case, Civil No. 31, 7 52
found, inter alia, as follows:
13. That the matters decided in the Fourth Judicial District Court, CiYil No. 31,379 determine
the lien claims of the Defendant Gerald Horman
Construction Company only, and the matters receiYed in eYidence in the present case are not
res adjudicata in determining the claims and offsets between the Plaintiff and Gerald l-Iorman
Company or G. C. Horman Construction Company. And are not res adjudicata as to the interpretation of Paragraph 11 of the agreement
of December 31, 196.5. (R. 80-81, Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law) .
The Court awarded a total J uclgment to defendants
upon its counterclaim in the amount of $20,000.00. The
Court reasoned as follows:
1 O. The Defendants are entitled to dmnaycs .for

the new mort,qaye commitment fee and the Attorney's f ('es ·u.:hich the Defendants hm e incurred
in enforcing their agreement of February 23,
1
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1967, and.

31, 1965 which ayreemcnts

were prelmunary to the Plaintiff and Gerald
Horman Construction Company being removed
from the motel construction and financing program by the Defendants because of Plaintiff's
failure to live up to his financial committments
t.he
of December 31, 1967. (R.
80, I< mdmgs of I< act and Conclusions of Law).
(Emphasis added).
The Judgment itself awards the following:
I. Defendants are awarded Judgment against
the Plaintiff C. G. Horman Company in the
amount of $14,000.00 representing the mortgage
committment fee paid by the Defendants because
of the bre ach of contract by the Plaintiff C. G.
Horman Company together with Attorney's fees
in the amount of $6,000.00, making a total J udgment of $20,000.00 which the Defendants shall
have against the Plaintiff C. G. Horman Company, together with costs. (R. 82).

Appellant further contends that the attorney fees
awarded are not warranted but has failed to include in its
designation of the record any testimony or documents
which would show that such attorneys fees were not necessary consequential damages due to appellants breach
of contract and are not reasonable under the circumstances.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT RULED
LY THAT THE DOCTRINE OF
CATA WAS NOT APPLICABLE
NOT A BAR TO RESPONDENTS'
CLAIM.
17

CORRECTRES JUDIAND WAS
COUNTER-

Appellant argues from the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in Civil No. 31,379 that the issues
presented in this the second case by defendants were
thereby previously reduced to judgment and should have
been dismissed herein based on the time-honored principle of res judicata. The case law cited in appellant's
brief supports the doctrine of res judicata and respondents will not attempt to dispute this law.
The fact is, however, the ·Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Civil No. 31,379, do not themselves support appellant's contention that the issues presented by
defendants' cross-complaint in Civil No. 31,379 were disposed of in such a fashion that it could be said that there
existed a conclusive and final ruling on those matters.
The Conclusions of Law in Civil No. 31,379 state:
-:1. That the Third Party Complaint of Virgil

J.
l\Iary C. Lloyd, his wife, and Ramada
Inn of Provo, Inc., against C. G. Horman Company, third party defendant, should be dismissed,
subject only to the reservation set forth in the
Findings of Fact. (R. 125). (Emphasis added).

The "reservation" to which paragraph 4 refers is
not specified, nor is the Decree and Judgment helpful in
elucidating. However, it is readily apparent that the
court intended to dismiss the third party complaint
"without prejudice to the rights of Virgil J. Lloyd,
Mary C. Lloyd, his wife, and Ramada Inn of Provo,
Inc., to state a defense or right of set off against C. G.
Horman Company in Civil Action No. 31,752 .... " (R.
124; iT20) (Findings of Fact, Civil No. 31,379)
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The dismissal of the Third Party Complaint in
Civil No. 31,379 without prejudice to the right of defendant's to assert a defense or set-off was hardly "an
:uljudication of all matters contained in respondents'
counterclaim in this action,'' (Appellant's Brief, p. 15).
On the contrary, the Counterclaim in this action was
expressly authorized.
The Findings of Fact in Civil No. 31,379 do say:
... That except for the matters of additional
sums, if any, due C. G. Horman Co. on account
of the purchase of its interest in the motel project
by Ramada Inn of Provo, Inc., Virgil J. Lloyd
and :Mary C. Lloyd, his wife, the parties . . .
compromised and settled and fully released all
claims existing between themselves by the terms
of the agreement of February 23, 1967, as implemented by an agreement between the same
parties dated lVIarch 23, 1967 ... and an agreemen dated April 24, 1967 . . . (R. 121). (Emphasis added) .
The question then becomes, what was the settlement?
The germane features of the agreements just mentioned
in the Findings of Fact are set forth below. This was included in the initial "settlement" of February 23, 1967:
A dispute exists between Lloyd-Ramada and
Hormans as to the balance, if any, that should
be paid to C. G. Horman upon the completion
of the motel construction; and if C. G. Horman
Co. so desires, at any time within one year, this
matter may be submitted to the Fourth .Judicial
District, on a friendly basis, for the court's interpretation of the parties rights under their con-

19

tract of December 31, 1965, and any subsequenl
modifications. ( R. 16).
This fas hi on for determining the parties' rights was
again stated in the said contract of March 23, 1967:
. . . Provided, however, that such release shall
not be construed as a "'aiYer of their right to
litigate their claims for such additional · sums
against Lloyd and Ramada . . . ( R. 20-21).
But most important is the contract of April 24, 1967, the
very last statement of the parties intention, signed in the
capacity of notary public by plaintiff's then and present
counsel, John l\Iarshall:
... Nothing contained herein shall be construed
as a waiver of the claim of C. G. Horman Co.,
that it is actually entitled to a sum of Fifty-11...,ive
Thousand Ffre Hundred Dollars ... for the sale
of its interest in the land and improvements constituting the said motel complex. Nor shall anything contianed herein be construed as a waiver
to any defense or right of set-off which coUld be
asserted U.lf Lloyds-Rama.da in the event of suit
by C. G. Horman Co. with respect to the said
claim. Nothing herein shall be construed as a
modification of the procedure set forth in the said
Agreement of Februar,y 2/J, 1967, for the determination of that claim. (R. 25) (Emphasis added).
This last agreement spells out specifically what
"settlement" 'nts reached: a contingent settlement, such
that if the dispute could not be resolved it would be litigated with the right of each of the parties to determine
each other's rights under the initial contract of Decem-
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her 31, 1965. That is what the Findings of Fact in Civil
No. 31379 refer to where it is stated that," ... the parties
settled that dispute by the execution of the Agreement
<lated February 23, 1967 ... " (R. 120, iT7), and further
in the record (iT8, R. 120 and 1121 previously set forth,
P. 8, respondent's brief) . The court was correct: the
parties settled their dispute by agreeing that if in time no
settlement could be reached, this dispute would be litigated. It was a temporary compromise and the Court in
the first case, Civil No. 31,379, realized this. The Court
there stated that the parties settled their dispute, by the
contracts of February, M:arch, and April, (R. 120, 121)
which is true, but only to the extent of their content; those
contracts speak for themselves and must be referred to
in order to understand the terms of "settlement." This
the court recognized in Civil No. 31,379, and therefore
specifically dismissed the defendants' third party complaint without prejudice to state a defense or right of
set-off against plaintiffs in the instant action. (R. 124,
1120) . Reading the Findings and Conclusions in Civil No.
31,379, the Court in Civil No. 31,752 could only conclude
that the third party complaint had been dismissed on the
prior action without prejudice subject to the settlement
reached in the agreements of February, March and
April, which speak for theniselves and which, of necessity, had to be interpreted, which Judge Nelson did in
No. 31,752, albeit to plaintiff's detriment; they had expressly not been interpreted by Judge Harding in No .
.'31,379. There is nothing in the record on appeal in this
case which would indicate that Judge Harding in No.
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31,379 had anything but the December, February,
.March, and April contracts upon which to render the
}'indings of Fact and he expressly ref used to determine
the rights of the parties thereunder and deferred that
controversy to the instant case
R. 124, as set forth
p. 9, this brief). Res judicata does not bar action on
issues which a court in a prior action expressly refused
to determine. Tadaro v. Gardner, 3 U.2d 404, 285 P.2d
839, ( 1955).
Furthermore in consideration of the doctrine of res
judicata, even if the parties rights were decided it is important to ascertain whether the issues decided were material to the Judgment. Nothing in the record indicates
that the defendants' third party complaint had any bearing upon that plaintiff's lien claims in Civil No. 31,379.
'Vhat Gerald Horman' s claims were in this first case is
not a matter of record; the complaint in Civil No. 31,379
is absent from the record on appeal; appellant did not
designate it to be part of the record. In this respect the
following rule has great importance:
For the purpose of Res J udicata, the significance
of what a court says it decides is controlled by
the issues which were open for decision. In other
words, what is to be concluded b.lf the a.d}udication is to be determined, not from the opinion, but
from a consideration of the ,judgment actually
rendered in reference to the issues presented for
decision, and if the question was not in issue
and was irrelevant to the issues presented, it is
immaterial that it was "passed on" hJJ the court.
The same result has been reached as to findings
of fact, as distinguished from the conclusion of
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the court as to the eff eet of such facts as a matter
of law .... 46 AmJ ur2d, Judgments, §426; also
see §423; Re TV est .Jordan Inc., 7 U.2d 391, 326
P.2d 105, (1958) (Emphasis added).
Also it must be borne in mind that in a case such as this
where there is a certain ambiguity as to what was and
was not passed upon that:
The general rule is that a person relying upon
the doctrine of Res .ludicata as to a particular
issue involved in a pending case bears the burden
of introducing evidence to prove that such issue
rcas involved and actuall/I deterrnined in the prior
action, where this does not appear from the record. Under this view, it must clearly appear from
the record in the former cause, or by proof by
competent evidence consistent therewith, that the
matter as to which the rule is invoked as a bar
was, in fact, necessarily adjudicated in the former
action. It is said that the defense of Res J udicata
through estoppel is to be allowed with caution,
and it must rest upon a more solid basis than
mere speculation as to what was actually adjudicated in the prior action ... and there can be no
estoppel where there is a reasonable doubt
whether a fact was actually adjudicated.
If the judgment in the prior case may have been
based on anvone of the several issues involved
therein, but ambigous and uncertain as to which
of the ser cral issues was the one determined in
arrivinq at the decision, the part// itnioking the
applications of the doctrine of Res .Tudicata is
r;enerallv required to show upon which
the
;udgment 'leas in fact based, and
this is not
done, the judgment does not constitute a conclusive adjudication as to any of the issues in1
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volved. . . . 46 AmJ ur2d, .Judgments, §607.
(Emphasis added) .
Going further, it is logical to argue that where ambiguity of a previous decision exists, the public policy of
disallowing a party to split his cause of action requires a
court to rule in favor of trying the questionable issues as
well as those not in question so that the claim may be adjudicated wholecloth. In other words, if there is substantial doubt whether an issue has been disposed of in a
prior action, resolve the doubt by trying it again. }"or
example, it must have been inconceivable to Judge Nelson in the second lawsuit, No. 31,752, that Judge Harding in the first lawsuit, No. 31,379, would dismiss half
of Lloyd-Ramada's cause of action to be ruled on in the
second lawsuit. It is incongruous to assume, absent some
affirmative showing, that Judge Harding would intentionally rule on half of Llyod-Ramada's claim against
C. G. Horman and defer the other half specifically to be
ruled on by Judge Nelson. Judge Nelson quite properly
refused to believe appellant's contention that this is what
Judge Harding had done, and if there was doubt because of ambiguity in the Findings of Fact in Civil No.
31,379, Judge Nelson resolved it in favor of the logical
position that the claim of Lloyd-Ramada should be tried
as a whole. If any doubt existed, it would have been dispelled by the language of the judgment itself, omitted
from appellant's designation of record, which recited
that the dismissal of the cross-complaint was without
perjudice. (Respondent's Brief, pps. 12-16).
Of course, a judgment is res judicata, "as to those
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matters upon which the ruling was necessarily based."
cCarthy v. State, 265 P.2d 387, 1 U.2d 207 ( 1935), at
265 P.2d 389, (emphasis added). But there is no showing that to render judgment in No. 31,379, on plaintiff,
Gerald Horman' s Complaint, it was necessary to rule
one way or another on defendant's cross-complaint; it
was apparently not a vital adjunct to the lawsuit. Plaintiff, Gerald Horman's complaint in Civil No. 31,379 is
not designated by appellant as a vital part of the appeal
record and it cannot be ascertained whether the crosscomplaint in this first action either added or detracted
from plaintiff, Gerald Horman's claim. There is no reported testimony, and no documents of record exist to
show that plaintiff's claim and defendant's cross-complaint were so inter-related that an adjudication of the
cross-complaint was necessary to afford a ruling upon
Gerald Horman' s lien claim. If appellant intends to rely
on the position that there was a necessity of ruling in the
first case on defendants', Lloyds' and Ramada's crosscom plaint, in order to allow a decision on plaintiff, Gerald Horman' s Complaint, the onus was upon appellant
to support this thesis
appropriate designations in the
record. As it stands, any findings the Harding court
made as to the cross-complaint in Civil No. 31,379, are
mere irre]evancies and not necessary to the basis of the
ruling.
Since the judgment is not present in the record and
a readin(J'
of it onlv
serves to benefit respondents rather
b
•
than appellant, the doctrine of res judicata cannot lie as
a bar:
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Upon the trial . . . the plaintiff introduced in
evidence what he contended was a judgment in
his fayor. . . . The plaintiff argues that the
defendant in the case at bar was bound as a privy
by the prior adjudication in the former action.
The paper \Vas received in evidence by the court,
and it is set forth at length in the record. It is
evidentlv nothing but a finding of fact by the
judge trying the cause ... TVithout a judgment
the plea of res judicata has no foundation; and
neither the verdict of a fury nor the findings of
a court, even thouyh in a prior action, upon the
precise point involved in a s1tbsequent action and
between the same parties, constitute a bar. In
other words, the thing ad.Judged must be by a
judgment. A verdict or finding of the court alone
is not sufficient. The reason stated is that the
judgment is the bar, and not the preliminary
determination of the court or jury .... The judgment alone is the foundation for the bar . . . . .
Oklahoma City v. McMaster, 196 U.S. 533, 2li
Sup. Ct. 325, 49 L.Ed. 587, (1905) at 49 L.Ed.
588, 599. (Emphasis added).
Numerous cases recite this principle that there can be no
estoppel except based upon a judgment. A judgment is
essential to its operation. See Winkleman v. General
Motors Corp., 48 F.S. 490, (D.C., So. D.N.Y., 1942):
"Of course, the findings of the court, like the verdict of
a jury, have not the same effect as a judgment in a plea
of res judicata." at 48 F.S. 494. Other cases in point are:
Sprinyer t'. Bien, 128 N.Y.99, 27
1076; Child v.
Morgan, 51Minn.116, 52 N.,V. 1127, (1892); TVil.Yon
v. TJTilson, 39 'Vash. 671, 82 P. 154; Hart v. BrierleJ/,
189 Mass. 598, 604, 76 N.E. 286;
.Goodwillic.
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208 Ill. 252, 70 N.E. 228; lselin v. C. W. Hunter Co.,
l 73 F.2d 388, 392, ( U.S.C.A., 5th Cir., 1949) ; Flynn v.
Flynn, 42 Cal.2d 55, 265 P.2d 865, (1954); Albright v.
Albri,qlzt, 21 X .l\!I. 606, 157 P. 662, ( 1916).
The judgment of the court below should be affirmed based, interalia, on the following rule which is
ultimately dispositive:
It is a suf fieient answer to the daim of estoppel
by the former judgment that (the findings) were
wholly irrelevant to the issues, and did not enter
into and were not involved in the final judgment.
Neither the verdict of a jury nor the findings of
a court in a prior action, upon the precise point
involved in a subsequent action between the same
parties constitute a bar, unless followed by a
judgment based thereon, or into which the verdict or finding entered. It is the judgment which
constitutes the bar, and not the preliminary determination of the court or jury. So, also, and for
obvious reasons, although judgment has been
entered, the judgment does not prevent relitigation of any irrelevant fact, although it may have
been litigated and found in a prior action. Sprin,qer v. Bien, supra, at 27 N.E. 1077.
Therefore the doctrine of merger can only be effected where the jud,qment subsumes the cause of action
underlying, and there is no estoppel where the court has
refused to rule (dismissal without prejudice) or the issues were not necessaril.IJ involved and determined in the
former action. Re J;Vest .Jordan, 7 U.2d 391, 326 P.2d
l 05, ( 1958). Note this language:
That doctrine only applies where a question of
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fact es:scntiril tu and detcnninati1-'C uf the judy-

ment 1s actually litigated and determined by a
valid or final judy merit which is conclusive as between the parties to a subsequent action on a difference cause of action. 7 U.2d at 394. (Emphasis
added).

As an aside, before concluding this point, it should
be mentioned that it clearly was not the Court's intention
in the first case in dismissing the Third Party Complaint
"without prejudice to the rights of ... (defendants) to
state a defense or right of setoff against C. G. Horman
Company in Civil No. 31,752 ... " (R. 124, Findings of
Fact, Civil No. 31,379), to limit the issue to the question
of what additional sums, if anv, were due C. G. Horman
and to limit the defendants to the right to state a defense
or right of setoff by way of recoupment only as appellant seems to contend, by continued emphasis in its brief
of the words "defense or right of setoff." That is exactly
what the respondents did, by way of their counterclaim:
state a defense and right of set-off. Counterclaim is the
term used exclusively in the URCP for what is stated
as a right of setoff. See Rule 13 (a) and ( b), URCP; 47
Am J ur, Setoff and Counterclaim, §6, P. 710. The task
of pleading is to give notice. Rule 8 (a), URCP; BlacJ.·ham v. Snelgrove, 3 U.2d 157, 280 P. 2d 453, (1955).
This notice the respondent gave by setting up the "defense or right of setoff" by way of a Counterclaim in the
second case, Civil No. 31,752.

It need only be mentioned that a counterclaim "may
claim relief exceeding in amount ... that sought in the
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pleading of the opposing party." Rule 13 ( c) URCP.
Therefore it was perfectly permissible for the District
Court to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint and allow recovery on defendants' Counterclaim (set off) .
To conclude this point, respondents note that all of
the cases which appellant cites implicity require a judgment or decree, disposing of the issues, in order for the
doctrine of res judicata to become operative. No prior
judgment exists in the record here. Its contents have
however been set forth in the statement of facts pps. 1216. 'Vithout benefit of the record, respondents may state
that the Judgment and Decree in No. 31,379 unreservedly dismissed the third party complaint "without prejudice to the rights of Virgil J. Lloyd; :Mary C. Lloyd,
his wife; and Ramada Inn of Provo, Inc. to state a defense of set-off against C. G. Horman in Civil Action
X o. 31,752 pending in the above entitled court." (Respondent's brief p. 15) . Therefore the lower court in
Civil No. 31,752 was not in error in refusing res judicata
as the basis for dismissal of the counterclaim in the second action; it could not have ruled other than it did without committing error.
POINT II
THIS APPEAL IS IN VIOLATION OF AN
AGREEMENT BET\VEEN TI-IE PARTIES TO
THIS ACTION \V AIVING THEIR RIGHT TO
APPEAL. APPELLANT AGREED NOT TO
APPEAL AND SHOCLD BE IIELD TO THAT
AGREEMENT.
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As hereinbefore stated the contract of February 23,
1967, (R. 15-18) contained a provision recognizing that
a dispute between the parties to this action existed as to
their respective rights under the December 31, 1965,
agreement "and any subsequent modifications." (R. 16).
This February contract recited that, " ... if C. G. Horman so desires ,at any time within one year, this matter
may be submitted to the Fourth District Court, on a
friendly basis, for the court's interpretation." This is
exactly what occurred: The contract was executed February 23, 1967 (R. 19) and somewhat less than one year
later C. G. Horman filed this action, February 21, 1968.
(R. 5). This same contract also states that, "Both parties
agree to abide by the decision of the District Court, and
no appeal will be taken to the Supreme Court." (R. 16).
And even though there were subsequent agreements
modifying this February contract, the existence of the
said dispute and proposal for litigation was never abandoned. The Agreement of April 24, 1967, (R. 24-27) is
the latest statement of the intent of the parties:
Nothing contained herein shall be construed as a
waiver of the claim of C. G. Horman Co. that it
is actuallv entitled to an additional sum, ... nor
shall an;ljthing contained herein be construed as a
waiver to anu defense or right of set-off which
conld !Je asserted by Lloyds-Ramada in the event
of suit bl/ C. G. Horman Co. with respect to the
wid c!ai:n.
contained herein shall be construed as a modification of the procedure set forth
in the Agreement of February 2.1, 1.967, for the
determination of that claim . ... (R. 25) (Emphasis added) .
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This latter contract was ostensibly prepared by appellant's attorney; it was verified by him (R. 27) and
prepared on his stationary. It was clearly agreed that no
appeal would be taken from the subject action. The parties waived their right to appeal. The key issue is, then,
does the public policy of the State of Utah allow parties
to waive their right to appeal at a time prior to trial of
the issues by a court of competent jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter?
A consideration of great importance is what public
policy demands are to be met. Agreements are generally
held to be against public policy when they tend to promulgate injustice, restrain liberty or legal and natural rights,
or where they tend to obstruct justice, all of which might
be argued in the case at bar. 17 AmJ ur2d, Contracts,
§179. There are however substantial competing considerations and courts should not declare agreements void
simply because they are improvident or even foolish so
long as mistake, fraud or oppression are not evident and
I.he parties are in equipoise and in command of their reason, and as in this case, advised by legal counsel. See 17
AmJ ur2d, Contracts, §191. The mere fact
t a bargain
is a hard one is no ground for relief, and so the question
reverts to whether the type of contract involved here is
proscribed as against the public policy of the State of
Utah.
This is, first off, readily distinguishable from a contract which requires the parties to submit their dispute
to arbitration and to be bound by that decision. That is
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clearly disallowed. Barnhardt v. Civil Service Eniployees Ins. Co., 398 P.2d 873, 16 U.2d 223, ( 1965).
" ... covenants which pre\'ent a party from having access
to court runs counter to both the expressed purpose and
the spirit of our system of justice." 16 U.2d at 223. In the
instant situation, however, resort to the courts was expressly recognized and enjoyed by the parties. The processes of the law were in no way inhibited; the lack of
"assurance either as to the integrity of the arbitration,
or that the parties will abide by it, except as the courts
will enforce it," is absent here because the dispute was
submitted to a duly constituted court of law. 16 U.2d at
228.
The right to review on appeal is another matter altogether. Although it is recognized that, "From all final
judgments of the District Courts, there shall be a right
of appeal to the Supreme Court," there are exceptions to
this right, and it may be waived. Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 9. It is also true that "Courts do not look
with favor upon attempts to oust them of their jurisdiction or to prevent them from fulfilling their responsibility of safeguarding the rights of everyone concerned;
and they will not give assistance to anyone in attempting
to defeat that objective." In Re Estate of Wallick, 18
U.2d 240, 24.5, 420 P.2d 40, (1966). However, the subject agreement to be bound by the decision of the district court did not oust the courts of their jurisdiction,
but expressly recognized it and agreed to stand by its
decision, only waiving the right to appeal.
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The right to appeal and redress in the appellate
court is a statutory and Constitutional right. Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 9, 11; Rule 72, U.R.C.P.;
Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 Pac. 117, 26
L.R.A. ( N .S.) 898, ( 1909). The right is absolute. Brophy v. Ogden Rapid Transit Co., 46 Utah 426, 430, 151
Pac. 49, ( 1915); Utah Commercial Savings Bank v.
Fox, 44 Utah 323, 331, 140 Pac. 660, ( 1914). N onethelcss this rig ht 11iay be waived. This is implicitly recognized in Bracken v. Dahle, 68 Utah 486, 449, 251 Pac.
16, ( 1926), wherein it was contended that since one party
(the State of Nevada) had the statutory right not to be
sued without its consent, that according to contractual
provisions the other party to the contract had the same
right. The contract stated:
And the first party herein is hereby expressly
given all the rights and privileges under this
agreement which the State of Nevada has under
said contract. 68 Utah at 499.
The court responded to this by recognizing the right to
waive redress in the courts by contract, but stating that
the language here used was too equivocal to so do:
Such waiYer shon]d at least be expressed in the
most unequiyocal terms. If the language used is
equivocal, it certainly ought not be interpreted in
fayor of the party insisting upon the waiver. 68
Utah at 499.
The party insiting upon the waiver in the case at bar is
stronger on two counts: ( 1) the district court had jurisdiction and tried the case and no bar to its jurisdiction
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was or is now urged; ( 2) the language of the contract is
inescapably clear:" ... No appeal will be taken ... " (R.
16, Contract, February 23, 1967). The terms are "most
unequivocal."
The right to appeal may always be waived after
judgment. Can it be waived prior to trial or judgment?
By the great weight of authority, however, a
party may, by express agreement or stipulatiou
before trial or judgment, waive his right to appeal or bring error, either wholly or partially and
such agreement or stipulation ·will be enforced bv
dismissal ... or by refusing to pass upon the
tions raised in the waiver.... 4 C.J.S., Appeal
and Error, §210 (E). See also 4 AmJ ur2d, Appeal and Error, s:23().
The requisites for valid waiver are that it clearly
appear from the terms of contract, it be entered into by
competent parties, it be in writing and part of the record,
and that it be supported by sufficient consideration. 4
C.J.S., Appeal and Error, §210 ( c). A reciprocal waiver
of the appeal
will satisfy the requirement of
consideration to support the waiver. 4 AmJur2d, Appeal
and Error, §237.
Cases upholding the validity of similar agreements
to abandon appeals are numerous. In an action to contest a 'Vill, the parties entered into written agreement
·which stated that, "if any questions should hereafter
arise between the parties hereto as to the construction
and enforcement of this agreement, the same shall be
submitted for decision to this ccurt and its decision
3-t

shall be final." It was held that since the agreement
<lid not oust all courts of jurisdiction, but on the contrary required the decision of a court of competent
jurisdiction, it was valid and binding on the parties,
the court reasoning that "we think on grounds of public
policy litigants should be encouraged to accept as final
the decisions of courts of original jurisdiction." Hoste ·
v. Dalton, 127
522, 100 N.,V. 750, 752, (1904).
This position was followed in Brown v. Brown; 35 Ohio
App. 182, 172 N.E. 416 ( 1930), in which it was held
that a divorce decree, which by agreement of the parties
contained a provision that application for modification
of support payments made by the husband to the wife
could be submitted to the trial court and that the parties
would be bound thereby, is a valid waiver of the right
appeal and enforceable. 172 N.E. at 418 .. Also see
U.S. Consoluuded Seeded Raisen Co. v. Chaddock and
Co., 173 F. 577, (9th Cir, 1909); cert. denied,_215 U.S .
.591, 54 L. Ed. 340, 30 S.C. 407, (1910); Speeth v.
Fields, 47 Ohio L. Abs. 47, 71 N.E.2d 149, (1946);
.Harmina v. Shay, 101 N.J. 273, 137 A. 558, (1927);
Indiana Power Co. v. Cool\., 182 Ind. 505,
Mich.
107 N.E. 12, (1949); Wyrzkowski v.
199, 38 N.W.2d 313, (1949); Phelps v. Blome, 150
Neb. 547, 35 N.W.2d 93, (1948). The aforementioned
U.S. Consolidated Raisin case is perhaps leading and
its facts comport closely with those of the case at bar.
All cases mentioned stand for the proposition that an
agreement not to appeal from a final judgment is valid,
binding, and enforceable if the intention to waive the
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right clearly appears from the terms of the agreement,
and is supported by valid consideration. Such is the
nature of the agreement in question.
Appellant now desires to get out of its
not to appeal. It should not be allowed to do so. The
contract is in every way valid and binding, supported
by sufficient consideration and executed by competent
parties.
Parties often stipulate as to issues both prior to
and during trial and these matters may not be appealed;
the privilege is waived. A submission by parties of an
issue to be ruled on in open court, and an agreement
to abide by that ruling prior to its issuance, would pose
a situation where parties should not be allowed to appeal.
The appellant should then not be allowed to breach
its agreement to submit the dispute to the court and
abide by its decision as final.

POIXT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Appellant correctly states that it was agreed between the parties in the }"ebruary 23, 1967, contract
that if this suit were filed:
Llovd-Ramada agree to retain and pay Leon
Fra"zier to handle said suit. If Hormans desire to
retain a separate attorney, they agree to pay their
own attorney':_; fec3. (TI. JG).
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This, however, does not say that the court in its discretion might now allow attorney's fees and the agreement does not state or imply that the court should be
foreclosed from such an award if it was deemed in the
interest of justice, which it apparently was. Furthermore, everything in the record seems to indicate that
these attorney's fees were awarded as consequential
<lamages running from the breach of contract, i.e., a
business expense rather than an expense of litigation.
The record does not indicate, either in quantity from
the size and nature of the file, or from the language
of the decisions rendered herein that the award of attorney's fees was for the actual trial work.
The Findings of Fact state as follows:
IO. The defendants are entitled to damages for

the ne'v mortgage commitment fee and attorney's
fees which the defendants have incurred in enforcing their agreement of February 23, 1967,
and December 31, 196.5, which agreements were
preliminary to the plaintiff and Gerald Horman
Construction Company being removed from the
motel construction and financing program by the
defendants because of the plaintiff's failure to
live up to his financial commitment made in the
agreement of December 31, 196.5. (R. 80, Findings of Fact, Civil No. 31, 7 52) .
Appellant argues that:
In short, defendants did not even claim that C. G.
Horman Company breached its agreements contained in the agreement of l\Iarch 23, 1967. (Appellant's brief, p. 20).
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That is correct but it is not the basis of the court's award
of attorneys fees. The previously stated Findings of
l'-.act make this clear. The award was for attorney's
fees incurred in enforcing the December 31, 1965 and
February 23, 1967 contracts.
The court below was competent to rule upon the
evidence, which this Court hasn't the luxury of reviewing due to its absence, and it must be assumed that the
evidence warranted attorney's fees. A very legitimate
construction of the award is that it was for consequential business expenses incurred as a result of the breach
of contract, and not for the cost of litigation as appellant
urges. The record does not dispute this.

CONCLUSION
Respondent prays the decision of the lower court
be affirmed, with costs.
Respectfully submitted,

HERSCHEL BULLEN

38

